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Abstract 
Previous research has found that interdependent self-construals are related to poorer 
intergroup outcomes.  Here we examine interdependent self-construal specifically in relation 
to comfort in contexts in which people are a numeric minority (i.e., outgroup comfort), and 
also examine the moderating roles of racial nominalism and racial essentialism.  Among a 
racially diverse sample (N = 577), interdependent self-construals were related to more 
outgroup comfort.  Two dimensions of racial nominalism—humanist and sociopolitical—
were established with exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses.  Humanist, 
sociopolitical, and essentialist beliefs about race were examined as moderators on the 
interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort relationship.  Among participants of 
color with higher sociopolitical beliefs, and unexpectedly among participants with higher 
essentialist beliefs, interdependent self-construal was more positively related to outgroup 
comfort.  Findings are discussed in relation to theory on self and group level construals, and 
the role of multicultural education for fostering sociopolitical beliefs about race.  
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Construals of self and group: How racial nominalism can promote adaptive 
intergroup outcomes for interdependent selves 
 
How people understand the concept of the self varies considerably; a predominant 
framework for understanding these variations is the distinction between the independent and 
interdependent self-construal (Markus & Kitayama, 1991); respectively, the self is either seen 
as distinct from or embedded in social contexts.  Self-construals have wide spread 
implications for people’s psychological and social experiences; for example, relative to 
independent, interdependent self-construals have been found to be related to a cognitive 
tendency to attribute behavior to situation rather than disposition, and an emotional 
tendency towards socially engaged emotions such as guilt (Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 
2011).  Of specific interest to this study is how interdependent self-construals are related to 
intergroup outcomes.  Generally speaking, past research suggests that interdependent self-
construals are related to greater challenges interacting across racial groups compared to 
independent selves.  These findings are commonly explained by the notion that people who 
endorse interdependent self-construals have a stronger collective identity with ingroup 
members (Lee, 2005; Routledge et al., 2012; Sekaquaptewa, Waldman, & Thompson, 2007; 
Siy & Cheryan, 2013; Smith et al., 2005), but consequently to the detriment of regard for 
outgroup members (Duclos & Barash, 2014; Howard, Gardner, & Thompson, 2007; 
Nakashima, Isobe, & Ura, 2008; Nakashima, Yanagisawa, & Ura, 2013; Lee, 2005; Wang et 
al., 2015).  
In an effort to understand the more prosocial aspects or adaptive functions of 
interdependent self-construals, we propose two contextual factors that may shift the pattern 
of findings of negative intergroup outcomes.  First, we attend to the role of power dynamics 
in our analyses of the interdependent self-construal; specifically, we are interested in the 
relation between interdependence and people’s degree of comfort while interacting in 
settings in which they are a numerical minority (i.e. outgroup comfort; Cole & Yip, 2008).  
We have some reason to suspect that interdependence may have more adaptive functions for 
people in outgroup contexts; particularly in more unwelcoming outgroup settings, 
interdependence may provide a means of safety or mitigation of hostility.  
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Second, the tendency to develop stronger collective identities and interdependence 
with racial ingroup members (to the exclusion of racial outgroup members) may be less 
pronounced among people who understand that races are socially constructed categories 
(i.e., racial nominalism) rather than naturally occurring entities (i.e., racial essentialism).  
Thus, among people with more developed nominalist understandings of race, we expect 
more positive intergroup outcomes for interdependence.  Conversely, we expect essentialist 
beliefs about race to exacerbate intergroup outcomes for interdependence. 
 We expand on these arguments in the following review.  First we examine more 
closely the concept of the interdependent self-construal, the body of research relating it to 
intergroup outcomes, and the smaller body of literature on interdependent self-construal that 
has specifically attended to power dynamics.  We then examine more closely the concepts of 
racial nominalism and essentialism, how each of these constructs have been related to 
intergroup outcomes, and further develop our case for why racial nominalism may promote 
more positive intergroup consequences of interdependent selves.     
Interdependent Self-Construal 
In their seminal theory, Markus and Kitayama (1991) offered a distinction between 
an interdependent and independent self-construal.  An interdependent self-construal is a way 
of understanding selfhood as inherently embedded in social contexts; the person draws 
relatively permeable boundaries between self and others.  This way of understanding the self 
tends to be more common among people who are socialized in collectivistic cultures 
including many Asian cultures (Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 2011; Markus & Kitayama, 
1991; Triandis, 1989).  By comparison, an independent self-construal is a way of 
understanding selfhood as distinct from social context; the person draws relatively rigid 
boundaries between the self and others.  This way of understanding the self tends to be 
more common among people socialized in individualistic cultures such as the U.S. (Cross, 
Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 2011; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989).  Of course 
within and across cultures there is tremendous variation among people with respect to their 
tendencies towards independent and interdependent self-construals.   
These rather fundamental differences in understandings of self have numerous and 
profound consequences for people’s psychological experiences including how people think, 
emote, and behave in relation to others.  As examples, cognitively, interdependent self-
construers tend to explain other people’s behavior as reactions to situational circumstance 
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rather than inherent attributes (e.g., aggressiveness).  Emotionally, interdependent self-
construers tend towards other focused emotions such as empathy in lieu of more self-
focused emotions such as sadness (Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 2011; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991). Behaviorally and relationally, interdependent self-construers tend to adjust 
their behavior in order to better fit in with present social settings and to prioritize harmony 
in relational interactions; for example, they may act relatively quiet and reserved when in the 
company of family elders, and more outgoing and talkative when with their peers (Cross, 
Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 2011; Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  In the next section, we examine 
research that has specifically examined how interdependent self-construals are related to how 
people tend to think and act in relation to others.   
Interdependent Self-Construal and Intergroup Outcomes 
Interdependent self-construals have rather consistently been related to preference for 
and stronger identification with the ingroup.  We are aware of only a few studies that have 
examined interdependence in the context of power dynamics such as situations in which one 
has minority status (Sekaquaptewa, Waldman, & Thompson, 2007; Tawa & Suyemoto, 
2010).  Generally the body of literature on interdependent self-construals has employed 
either self-report survey assessment of self-construal (e.g., Singelis, 1994) or experimental 
methods in which subjects are “primed” with interdependent or independent self-construals, 
for example, by asking participants to visualize themselves as a subject in a short story 
written using either first-person singular pronouns (e.g., “I” to prime an independent self-
construal) or first-person plural pronouns (e.g., “We” to prime an interdependent self-
construal; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999).  
Interdependence and intergroup behavior.  Using self-report and experimental 
methods, researchers have found interdependent self-construals to be related to feelings of 
greater racial ingroup importance (Lee, 2005; Routledge et al., 2012), greater identification 
with racial and national ingroups (Sekaquaptewa, Waldman, & Thompson, 2007; Smith et al., 
2005), and more positive feelings towards their ingroup (Siy & Cheryan, 2013; Smith et al., 
2005).  For example, Siy and Cheryan (2013) found that Asian Americans who endorsed 
interdependent self-construals were more accepting of positive stereotypes of Asian 
Americans compared to those with independent self-construals.  Greater interdependence 
with ingroup members, however, appears to come at the expense of regard for outgroup 
members.  Researchers have found interdependent self-construals to be related to less 
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generosity in resource allocation tasks to racial outgroup members (Duclos & Barasch, 2014; 
Nakashima, Isobe, & Ura, 2008), greater interpersonal stress (Nakashima, Yanagisawa, & 
Ura, 2013), less favorable attitudes towards racial outgroup members (Lee, 2005), and less 
neural activity indicating less empathy when watching videos of racial outgroup members 
(compared to ingroup members) experiencing pain (Wang et al., 2015).  Regarding the later 
study, Chinese university students (N = 30) who were primed with interdependent self-
construals demonstrated significantly greater neural responses in the left supplementary 
motor area, mid-cingulate cortex, and left insula when viewing Asian models experiencing 
pain relative to White models; yet no discrepancy was found when primed with independent 
self-construals (Wang et al., 2015).  We are aware of only one study that has found adaptive 
intergroup outcomes for an interdependent self-construal; Yeh and Arora (2003) found that 
among a sample of professional school psychologists, interdependent self-construal was 
related to greater awareness and acceptance of similarities and differences between people.  
 Interdependence and intergroup behavior in contexts of power.  Studies that 
have examined the role of situational power provide some peripheral support for the notion 
that interdependence may have an adaptive function in contexts in which people are a 
minority. African Americans who were placed in experimental groups and who were the only 
Black member of the group (i.e., solo status) consequently reported higher interdependent 
self-construals than African Americans placed in non-solo status experimental groups 
(Sekaquaptewa, Waldman, & Thompson, 2007).  In a qualitative study, Asian American 
participants described interdependent self-construals as allowing them to fit in and minimize 
the potential impact of racism when they were in predominantly White social settings (Tawa 
& Suyemoto, 2010).  Lastly, Howard, Gardner, and Thompson (2007) conducted a series of 
experiments, in which participants role played as power holders (i.e., real estate developers) 
engaged in a financial settlement with low-power group members (i.e., owner of a small 
carpentry business).  When the scenario depicted the power holders as a group (i.e., a team of 
real estate developers), primed interdependent self-construals were related to less generosity 
in the financial settlement towards the low-power outgroup.  However, when the scenario 
depicted the power holder as engaged in a one-on-one dispute with a low-power group 
member, interdependence was related to greater generosity towards the low-power group 
member.  Presumably, in the context of group disputes, interdependence serves to heighten 
concern for one’s group; however without an immediate referent group to extend ones 
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interdependence towards, interdependence was extended instead to the low-power outgroup 
member and was characterized as cooperation or at least, a more benevolent use of power 
(Howard, Gardner, & Thompson, 2007).  Although not examined in this study, 
interdependence among those in low-power statuses may increase people’s willingness to 
extend one’s group boundaries to a more powerful outgroup, just as the high-power 
participants did with the low-power people in Howard Gardner, and Thompson (2007).  
Although these findings give us reason to suspect that interdependent selves will be related 
to more comfort in contexts in which people are a minority (i.e., outgroup comfort; Cole & 
Yip, 2008), none of these studies directly test this hypothesis.  Such is the purpose of the 
current study.   
 In summary, interdependent self-construal has generally been found to be associated 
with favorable ingroup attitudes and behaviors and simultaneously poorer intergroup 
attitudes and behaviors. We have some reason to suspect that interdependent self-construal 
will have a more adaptive function in contexts in which people are a minority.  The overall 
findings of negative relations of interdependent self-construals are somewhat 
counterintuitive given the prosocial tendencies of interdependent self-construers, as 
described earlier.  Again, a common rationale is that people who endorse interdependent 
self-construals develop a stronger collective identity with ingroup members, but often to the 
detriment of regard for outgroup members. Yet, our perspective is that reserving 
interdependence for one’s racial ingroup relies on the interdependent self-construers’ 
supposition—the false supposition—that racial groups are real, fixed entities (i.e., racial 
essentialism).  Thus, as people develop more nominalist notions of race, for example 
through education, interdependence may no longer be limited to racial ingroup members and 
may in fact be related to improved intergroup outcomes. The notably divergent findings in 
the Yeh and Arora (2003) study described above seems to support this hypothesis given that 
they used a sample of professional school counselors, many of whom had had previous 
multicultural educational experiences (an average of 5.2 multicultural workshops over the 
course of their career).  Through multicultural education, the commonly held assumptions 
about racial essentialism may be supplanted with more socially constructed notions of race 
(i.e., racial nominalism).  
Belief in Racial Nominalism 
CONSTRUALS OF SELF AND GROUP     8      
 In addition to differences in understandings of self, social scientists recognize 
differences in how people understand social groups, including racial groups.  An emerging 
framework for understanding differences in racial groups is the distinction between 
essentialist and nominalist understandings of race (Kvaale & Haslam, 2015; Sundstrom, 
2002; Tawa, 2018).  Racial essentialism is the notion that races are naturally existing entities 
comprised of members who share inherent attributes and values, and among whom 
interrelations should occur naturally and seamlessly (Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Kvaale & 
Haslam, 2015; Tawa, 2017).  On the other hand, racial nominalism is the notion that races 
were created and are maintained through social, historical, and political circumstance; for 
example, the idea that race was developed as a way to rationalize slavery (Kvaale & Haslam, 
2015; Sundstrom, 2002; Tawa, 2018).  The impact of racial nominalism on intergroup 
outcomes has been scantly observed; moreover, the research that has been conducted on 
racial nominalism has tended to assess the extent to which racial essentialism is not endorsed 
(Kung et al., 2017; Shih et al., 2007; No et al., 2008), rather than directly measure racial 
nominalism. We argue here that racial nominalism is an active belief in its own right, not 
merely the absence or rejection of essentialism; in fact, there may be more than one type of 
racial nominalism.   
In a recent qualitative study exploring college students’ views about race, Tawa 
(2018) found that some participants described race as “socially constructed” insofar as they 
believed races shared a single human origin in Africa and that phenotypic variation in people 
was a result of geographic and climate-related adaptation concurrent with migration.  We 
refer to this belief here as a “humanist” belief in race.  On the other hand, some participants 
described races as “socially constructed” insofar as they believed that the idea of race—and 
the related assumption of inherent superiority of the White race—was created by people in 
positions of power (i.e., White people) in order to rationalize human atrocities such as 
slavery and the attempted genocide of Native Americans.  We refer to this belief here as a 
“sociopolitical” belief in race.  We believe a primary distinction between these two 
constructs is that sociopolitical beliefs in race includes an understanding of the role of power 
in the formation of race, while the humanist belief does not.  Humanism may be more akin 
to what is referred to as a colorblind racial attitude (Neville et al., 2000).  We are not aware 
of previous research distinguishing between various types of racial nominalism but do expect 
these variations in beliefs to have different moderating impacts on the relationship between 
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interdependent self-construals and outgroup comfort.  We expand on these arguments 
below.  First, however, we discuss the body of research examining how belief in race affects 
intergroup outcomes. 
 Racial Nominalism and Intergroup Outcomes 
A considerable body of research has been conducted on racial essentialism which has 
relatively consistently been found to be related to negative intergroup outcomes (Chao, 
Hong & Chiu, 2013; Gaither et al., 2014; No et al., 2008; Tadmor et al., 2013; Tawa, 2016; 
Tawa, 2017; Williams & Eberhardt, 2008) such as less racial diversity in one’s peer group 
(Williams and Eberhardt, 2008), and more outgroup discomfort (e.g., Tawa, 2017). The 
impact of racial nominalism has been more scantly examined.  Moreover, the few self-report 
survey studies that have framed their analyses in relation to the impact of belief in race as 
socially constructed (Kung et al., 2017; No et al., 2008; Shih et al., 2007) have generally used 
the same scales used to measure racial essentialism, simply coded in reverse.  These findings 
do, however, support more adaptive intergroup outcomes: Asian Americans who endorsed 
more socially constructed views of race were found to be more likely to identify with and be 
more “cognitively assimilated” to the majority culture (No et al., 2008), and Hong Kong 
University students with greater belief in race as socially constructed had higher levels of 
trust towards outgroup members in intergroup settings (Kung et al., 2017).  Both of these 
studies used No and Hong’s (2005) 8-item scale (unpublished but described in No et al., 
2008) in which the first four items measure people’s endorsement of racial essentialism (e.g., 
“To a large extent, a person’s race biologically determines his or her abilities and traits”) and 
the last four items assess the extent to which people think of race as socially constructed 
(e.g., “Race does not have an inherent biological basis, and thus can be changed;” No et al., 
2008, p. 1004).  For this measure, a factor analysis did not support a 2-factor structure, thus, 
the authors recommend that social construction items be reverse scored to load positively on 
to racial essentialism, or, in the case of the above studies the racial essentialism items are 
reverse coded to indicate belief in race as a social construction (Kung et al., 2017; No et al., 
2008).        
These researchers have also conducted studies to experimentally examine belief in 
race as a social construction (Kung et al., 2017; No et al., 2008; Shih et al., 2007) and these 
findings are consistent with the self-report studies described above.  For example, 
participants in a non-Asian, primarily White sample who were primed by writing a short 
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paragraph agreeing with a description of race as a social construction were less vulnerable to 
the impact of stereotype threat (i.e., the threat of poorer intellectual performance relative to 
Asians) on a lexical-decision task (Shih et al., 2007).  Using similar primes, Kung et al. (2017) 
and No et al. (2008) replicated their survey findings described above.  Thus, racial 
nominalism does appear to have an adaptive influence on intergroup outcomes.  In the 
current study, we sought to examine the moderating impact of racial nominalism as well as 
racial essentialism on the relationship between interdependent self-construal and outgroup 
comfort, and we sought to more directly measure belief in racial nominalism. 
Racial Nominalism for Promoting Adaptive Intergroup Outcomes  
The previous research reviewed above has relatively consistently found 
interdependent self-construal to be related to poorer relations across racial groups.  Again, a 
common rationale for these findings is that people with interdependent self-construals 
develop a stronger collective identity with ingroup members (Lee, 2005; Routledge et al., 
2012; Sekaquaptewa, Waldman, & Thompson, 2007; Siy & Cheryan, 2013; Smith et al., 
2005), but often to the detriment of regard for outgroup members (Duclos & Barash, 2014; 
Howard, Gardner, & Thompson, 2007; Nakashima, Isobe, & Ura, 2008; Nakashima, 
Yanagisawa, & Ura, 2013; Wang et al., 2015).  Yet, as we suggested earlier, we suspect that 
the tendency to reserve interdependence for racial ingroup members (to the exclusion of 
outgroup members) may be less pronounced among people who understand that races are 
socially constructed categories; racial nominalism may buffer the negative effects of 
interdependent self-construals and even promote or strengthen intergroup relations.  If a 
person understands that races are malleable socially constructed categories with no inherent 
trait abilities and with whom one has no natural compatibility, then they are not likely to 
limit those included in their self-boundary to only racial ingroup members.  To be sure, 
people—even those with highly developed nominalist understandings of race—may share 
affinity within racial ingroup members, perhaps based on the recognition of shared social 
experiences and for people of color, shared histories of racism.  However, we suspect that 
boundaries will not be deterministically based on race membership.  For example, a person 
of color with a highly developed nominalist understanding of race may include a close White 
ally with a strong understanding of racism in their self-boundaries.   
Furthermore, we suspect that a humanist view may have more limited intergroup 
benefits compared to a sociopolitical view because it does not necessitate an understanding 
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of racism and power dynamics.  In fact, people who endorse humanist views about race may 
simultaneously minimize the existence of racism, an ideology frequently referred to as a 
colorblind racial attitude (Neville et al., 2000).  Colorblindness has been directly linked to 
poorer intergroup outcomes including greater marginalization within diverse social networks 
(Tawa, Ma, & Katsumoto, 2016) and greater prejudice (Apfelbaum, Sommers & Norton, 
2008).  On the other hand, we expect that sociopolitical views about race will be related to 
an active rejection of colorblind racial views, and expect that sociopolitical racial nominalism 
will be considerably more effective in promoting adaptive intergroup relationships for 
interdependent individuals.  We examine the relation of humanist and sociopolitical beliefs 
in race to colorblind racial attitudes only to more fully understand these constructs which are 
being developed in this study.  We then pose our primary hypotheses as they have been 
developed in this review.  
Hypotheses 
Construct Validity Hypotheses 
 Hypotheses were developed to provide some validity for our measure of racial 
nominalism.  Consistent with the emerging framework distinguishing between essentialist 
and nominalist views of race (Kvaale & Haslam, 2015; Sundstrom, 2002; Tawa, 2018), we 
expected racial nominalism and essentialism to be inversely related.  In addition, as discussed 
above, we examined the relation of racial nominalist beliefs to colorblind racial attitudes.  We 
predicted:   
H1.  Humanist belief in race will be negatively related to racial essentialism. 
H2.  Sociopolitical belief in race will be negatively related to racial essentialism.    
H3.  Humanist belief in race will be positively related to colorblind racial attitudes. 
H4.  Sociopolitical belief in race will be negatively related to colorblind racial 
attitudes. 
Primary Hypotheses 
 By focusing on contexts of situational power in which people are a numerical 
minority, and by considering variation in people’s level of racial nominalism, we expected 
more adaptive intergroup outcomes for interdependent self-construals.  Conversely, we 
expected that racial essentialism would have a negative impact on intergroup outcomes.  We 
predicted:  
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H5.  Interdependent self-construal will be related to higher levels of outgroup 
comfort. 
H6.  Humanistic belief in race will not moderate the relationship between 
interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort. 
H7.  Sociopolitical belief in race will moderate the relationship between 
interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort, such that among those 
with higher levels of sociopolitical belief in race, interdependent self-construal 
will be more positively related to outgroup comfort. 
H8.  Essentialist belief in race will moderate the relationship between interdependent 
self-construal and outgroup comfort, such that among those with higher levels 
of essentialist belief in race, interdependent self-construal be more negatively 
related to outgroup comfort. 
Method 
Procedures 
Procedures for subject recruitment.  Data were collected using an online survey. 
Participants were recruited in classrooms at the first author’s university, on online survey 
hosting sites (i.e., Craigslist and Facebook), and though Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk).  Research assistants went into classrooms and provided links to the online survey 
and also posted a link to the survey on websites targeting major U.S. cities (e.g., New York, 
Los Angeles).  Participants recruited in classrooms and online were incentivized with a 
chance to win a $300 gift card to Amazon.com and those recruited on MTurk each received 
$1.50 for completion of the survey.  
  Procedures for data cleaning.  Survey research, particularly when collected online, 
is vulnerable to careless responding (Huang et al., 2012; Meade & Craig, 2012).  Meade and 
Craig (2012) have found that surveys that provided a warning prior to survey administration 
were significantly less likely to be completed carelessly than surveys with no warning. Thus, 
in the current survey administration, participants were warned that carelessly responding to 
items could result in their survey being removed from the pool of potential gift card winners 
or payment being withheld.  IP addresses were examined and revealed no duplicates, thus 
there was no indication that a single person had completed the survey multiple times.  In 
addition, the researcher examined completion time as an indicator of carelessly completed 
protocols (Huang et al., 2012).  Research assistants completing the survey prior to its 
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administration estimated a completion time of approximately 20 minutes. Thus, protocols 
completed in less than 5 minutes were flagged and response patterns were examined 
manually.  Among the 26 flagged protocols, 12 were comprised of obvious bogus response 
patterns and were removed leaving a final sample of 577.  
Participants 
Among the 577 participants, self-identified genders included: 217 male (37.6%), 348 
female (60.3%), 2 transgender (0.004%), and 9 other (1.6%).  Self-identified races included: 
46 Asian (8.0%), 50 Black (8.7%), 52 Latino/a (9.0%), 8 Native American (1.4%), and 378 
White (65.5%).  Thirty-nine participants (6.8%) selected more than one race, and 4 (0.7%) 
selected no races.  Collectively, non-White participants (i.e., Asian, Black, Latino/a, Native 
American, and multiracial) comprised 33.8% of the sample.  Among the overall sample, 
11.0% were immigrants. Participants’ average age was 31.12 (SD = 13.31).  
Measures 
Belief in racial essentialism.  Belief in racial essentialism was measured using the 
Beliefs About Race Scale (BARS; Tawa, 2017), which assess four types of essentialist beliefs 
about race (i.e., speciation, genotypic essentialism, phenotypic essentialism, and behavioral 
essentialism).  Although the initial scale construction emphasized support for a four factor 
solution, fit indices for a bifactor model (a superordinate factor comprised of the four 
subscales) approached adequacy.  In this study, our primary intent of using the BARS was to 
provide some construct validity for the measure of racial nominalism by establishing its 
distinction from the broader construct of racial essentialism.  We did not have specific 
hypotheses related to the four types of racial essentialism in relation to racial nominalism.  
Thus, for the sake of parsimony, BARS items were examined as a single measure of belief in 
racial essentialism.  A sample item is: “During an autopsy, the race of a person can be 
determined by examining bone structure.”  This scale is comprised of 16 items that are 
scored on a 6-point Likert scale with responses ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to 
“strongly agree” (6).  Thus the possible range of computed scores is 16 to 96; scores in the 
current sample ranged from 16 to 86 (M = 49.48; SD = 12.25).  The Cronbach internal 
reliability estimate with the current sample was  = .82.  
Colorblind racial attitudes. The Colorblind Racial Attitudes Scale (CoBRAS: 
Neville et al., 2000) is a 20 item scale designed to assess the extent to which people minimize 
or deny the social significance of race and reject the notion that racism still exists.  A sample 
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item is: “Racism may have been a problem in the past, but it is not an important problem 
today” (Neville et al., 2000). This scale is comprised of 20 items that are scored on a 6-point 
Likert scale with responses ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (6).  
Thus the possible range of computed scores is 20 to 120; scores in the current sample 
ranged from 20 to 114 (M = 58.19; SD = 18.96). The CoBRAS has demonstrated adequate 
stability over time (Neville et al., 2000).  Cronbach internal reliability estimate with the 
current sample was  = .92. 
Interdependent self-construal.  Interdependent self-construal was measured a 
using a 15-item version of the Singelis Self-Construal Scale (SCS; Singleis, 1994); this version 
added three items to the original 12-item SCS to improve internal reliability (Singelis & 
Brown, 1995).  A sample item is: “I often have the feeling that my relationships with others 
are more important than my own accomplishments.”  The 15 items in this scale were scored 
on a 6-point Likert scale with responses ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly 
agree” (6).  Thus the possible range of computed scores is 6 to 90; scores in the current 
sample ranged from 15 to 88 (M = 59.87; SD = 9.88).  A Cronbach internal reliability 
estimate with the current sample was  = .80. 
Outgroup comfort.  Outgroup comfort was initially developed to assess Black 
students’ levels of comfort in predominantly White universities (Cole & Yip, 2008), but has 
also been examined for multiple racial group members in minority status contexts (e.g., a 
White attendee at a predominantly Black social gathering; Cole et al., 2011). A sample item 
is: “I can enjoy myself at a party even if there aren’t many other people of my race there.”  
All items include some aspect of being a numerical minority (i.e., low power). This scale is 
comprised of 15 items that are scored on a 6-point Likert scale with responses ranging from 
“strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (6).  Thus the possible range of computed scores 
is 15 to 90; scores in the current sample ranged from 24 to 90 (M = 75.60; SD = 12.79).  A 
Cronbach internal reliability estimate with the current sample was  = .93. 
Belief in racial nominalism.  We are not aware of a previously existing scale 
assessing multiple dimensions of racial nominalism, thus, a scale was constructed for the 
current study.  The researcher and two research assistants developed items based on 
statements made by participants in the qualitative study described in Tawa (2018).  In order 
to run exploratory factor analyses (EFA) and confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) with 
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separate samples, the data were split into two equal size data sets using random assignment, 
with 288 participants assigned for the EFA and 288 participants assigned for the CFA.  This 
division of participants is sufficient based on guidelines approximating 10 participants per 
item for EFA (Osborne & Costello, 2004) and a total of 200 - 300 participants for CFA 
(Meyers, Ahn, & Jin, 2011).  An EFA using principal axis factoring and specifying 2 factors 
with an oblique (Direct Oblimin) rotation was examined. A Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin score of .82 
indicated that the sample size was adequate. Factor loadings supported the presence of both 
a humanist belief in race (H) and a sociopolitical belief in race (SP). All factor loadings using 
the EFA sample were higher than the .32 threshold recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2007; see Table 1). 
The fit of the racial nominalism scale was examined using CFA; we examined a one-
factor (all 11 items as a single factor) and the two factor solution.  Comparisons were based 
on five model-fit indices and their guidelines: The ratio of the Chi-Square statistic to degrees 
of freedom should range between 1 and 3; Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA) and Standardized Root Mean Square (SRMR) should approach statistical 
significance (p < .05); and Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) 
scores should reach between .90 and .95 (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Hu & Bentler, 1999; 
Jackson, Gillaspy, & Purc-Stephenson, 2009).  The two factor approached adequacy and was 
a stronger fit than the one-factor model (see Table 2).  In the last step, modification indices 
were examined in order to improve the fit of the two factor model by including correlated 
error variances between item pairs.  The use of modification indices can be justified when 
used sparingly and when modifications are theoretically plausible (Jackson, Gillaspy, & Purc-
Stephenson, 2009). Thus, correlations of error variances were limited to four item pairs, and 
only when item pairs occurred within the same subscale (1 and 2; 1 and 5; 7 and 9; 8 and 9).  
The modified two-factor model was adequate as indicated by all five fit statistics (see Table 
2).  
The 5 items comprising the humanist (H) scale and the 6 items comprising the 
sociopolitical (SP) scale are scored on a 6-point Likert scale with responses ranging from 
“strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (6).  Thus the possible range of computed scores 
for the humanist scale is 5 to 30 (scores in the current sample ranged from 5 to 30; M = 
22.91; SD = 4.78) and the possible range of scores for the sociopolitical scale is 6 to 36 
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(scores in the current sample ranged from 6 to 32; M = 21.45; SD = 3.56). Cronbach alpha 
reliability estimates were examined with the full data set (H scale  = .72; SP scale  = .86).   
Results 
Construct Validity of the Racial Nominalism Scale  
As expected, the humanist subscale of the racial nominalism scale was negatively 
related to racial essentialism (H1), however the sociopolitical subscale was not (H2).  Both 
humanist and sociopolitical subscales were negatively related to colorblind racial attitudes; 
this relation was unexpected for the humanist subscale (H3) but was expected for the 
sociopolitical subscale (H4; see Table 3). 
Preliminary Analyses of Group Differences 
We tested group differences on interdependent self-construal, outgroup comfort, 
and each belief about race by participant race, gender, and immigration status (See Table 4). 
Participants of color had significantly higher levels of interdependent self-construal, racial 
essentialism, sociopolitical belief in race, and lower levels of humanistic belief in race 
compared to White participants.  Females had higher levels of outgroup comfort and lower 
levels of racial essentialism than males.  Immigration status was not related to any of the 
study variables.  Age was negatively correlated with interdependent self-construal (r = -.17; p 
= .00), and marginally negatively correlated with sociopolitical belief in race (r = -.09; p = 
.03).   Given that participants’ race was significantly related to all of the independent 
variables (i.e., interdependent self-construal, racial essentialism, and both subscales of racial 
nominalism), we controlled for participant race in all of our primary analyses.    
Primary Analyses 
For the primary analyses, all variables were first standardized to ease interpretation.  
Consistent with our hypothesis (H5), interdependent self-construal was positively related to 
outgroup comfort (r = .22; p < .001).  This relationship was not affected by participant race 
[R2= .00; F(1, 572) = .70; p = .40].  For hypotheses 6 through 8, we examined how the 
relationship between interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort was affected by 
varying levels of humanist (H6), sociopolitical (H7), and essentialist (H8) beliefs about race.  
We also examined whether these self and group level interactions differed by participants’ 
race.  These hypotheses were examined using one hierarchical regression.  In the first step of 
the model, we entered interdependent self-construal, participant race, and all three beliefs 
about race (humanist, sociopolitical, and essentialist); in the second step, we added all two-
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way interactions involving interdependent self-construal and participant race and all two-way 
interactions involving beliefs about race and participant race. The beliefs about race were not 
allowed to interact with each other. In the third step, we added the three-way interaction 
terms involving interdependent self-construal, each belief about race, and participant race 
(see Table 5).  
Based on the first model, higher interdependent self-construal was related to greater 
outgroup comfort controlling for the three beliefs about race and participant race, consistent 
with H5 [ß = 0.27, t(570) = 6.86, p < .001]. Additionally participant race was related to 
outgroup comfort such that people of color had higher outgroup comfort controlling for 
interdependent self-construal and beliefs about race [ß = 0.19, t(570) = 2.24 p = .03]. Next 
we examined how beliefs about race interact with interdependent self-construal and 
participant race to predict outgroup comfort.  
Humanist Beliefs about Race. Based on the first fit model there was no significant 
evidence that humanist beliefs about race predicted outgroup comfort above and beyond all 
other predictors (interdependent self-construal, participant race, sociopolitical beliefs about 
race, and essentialist beliefs about race [ß = .07, t(570) = 1.79, p = .07]. In the second model 
there was no significant evidence that the effect of interdependent self-construal on 
outgroup comfort was moderated by humanist beliefs about race [ß = -.06, t(563) = -1.70, p 
= .09] or that humanist beliefs about race moderated the effect of participant race on 
outgroup comfort [ß = -.06, t(563) = -.68, p = .49]. In the final model, there was no 
significant evidence that the degree to which humanist beliefs about race moderates the 
effect of interdependent self-construal on outgroup comfort depends on participant race (ß 
= -.11, t(560) = -1.12, p = .26). Overall, these results suggest that controlling for other beliefs 
about race (including essentialist and sociopolitical) humanist beliefs about race do not have 
a notable relationship with outgroup comfort particularly with respect to interactions with 
interdependent self-construal or participant race.  
Sociopolitical Beliefs about Race. Based on the first fit model there was no significant 
evidence that sociopolitical beliefs about race predicted outgroup comfort above and beyond 
all other predictors [ß = -.06, t(570) = -1.45, p = .15]. In the second model there was no 
significant evidence that the effect of interdependent self-construal on outgroup comfort 
was moderated by sociopolitical beliefs about race [ß = .03, t(563) = .95, p = .34].  In the 
final model, the degree to which sociopolitical beliefs moderated the effect of 
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interdependent self-construal on outgroup comfort depended significantly on participant 
race [ß = .18, t(560) = 2.19, p = .03]. Comparison of conditional effects (by participant race) 
suggested that for people of color, sociopolitical beliefs about race significantly moderated 
the relationship between interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort [ß = .17, t(560) 
= 2.39, p = .02]; for Whites, it did not [ß = -.01, t(560) = -.12, p = .90].  We used regression 
coefficients to create “prototypical plots” (Singer & Willet, 2003) for interpretation of the 
moderating effect of sociopolitical beliefs for people of color (see Figure 1).  Consistent with 
our prediction (H7)—at least among people of color—those with higher sociopolitical belief 
in race had a stronger positive relationship between interdependent self-construal and 
outgroup comfort compared to those with lower sociopolitical belief in race. Overall, these 
results suggest that sociopolitical beliefs about race seem to play a unique role in the 
relationship between interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort among people of 
color.  
Essentialist Beliefs about Race. Based on the first fit model, there is a strong relationship 
between essential beliefs about race and outgroup comfort such that higher essentialist 
beliefs about race predict less outgroup comfort controlling for interdependent self-
construal and the other beliefs about race [ß = -.42, t(570) = -10.87, p < .001]. In the second 
model there was a significant interaction between interdependent self-construal and 
essentialist beliefs about race [ß = 0.11, t(563) = 3.51, p < .001]. This means that those higher 
on essentialist beliefs about race will have a more positive relationship between 
interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort, inconsistent with our prediction (H8). 
Prototypical plots were created for interpretation of the significant interaction (see Figure 2). 
In the final model, there was no significant evidence that the interaction between 
interdependent self-construal and essentialism beliefs about race depended on participant 
race [ß = -.07, t(563) = -.78, p = .44]. To summarize, some of these results are contradictory 
to our hypotheses. We see an overall negative relationship between essentialist beliefs about 
race and outgroup comfort, which is expected. However, we expected that the relationship 
between interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort would become more negative 
for those higher on essentialist beliefs about race compared to those who are lower. Instead, 
we found that for those higher on essentialist beliefs about race the relationship between 
interdependent self-construal was more positive and did not depend on participant race. 
These results were fairly surprising and warrant further study.  
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Discussion 
In a recent review paper of the role of the self in group relation processes, Hogg, 
Abrams, and Brewer (2017) call for research that addresses complexities in people’s 
understandings of “us” and “not us” boundaries; over 20 years of research consistently 
demonstrates that developing more complex group identities that weaken ingroup and 
outgroup distinctions can simultaneously foster more inclusive identities and lessen prejudice 
and negative affect towards outgroups.  Our study responds to this call, both in content—by 
examining how complex beliefs about self and groups interact to impact intergroup 
outcomes—but also in method, by offering an instrument that allows for the measurement 
of people’s understandings of group boundaries.  In this discussion, we consider some 
remaining questions as well as new questions that arise from some unexpected findings, and 
suggest some future applications for the study of racial nominalism in self and identity 
research. 
To summarize our findings briefly, we found that as a primary relationship 
interdependent self-construals were related to more outgroup comfort.  As expected, 
sociopolitical belief in race had a moderating effect on the relationship between 
interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort, but only for people of color.  Among 
people of color with higher sociopolitical belief in race, interdependent self-construal was 
related to more outgroup comfort; among those with lower sociopolitical belief in race, 
interdependent self-construal was unrelated to outgroup comfort.  Also as expected, 
humanist belief in race did not impact the relationship between interdependent self-construal 
and outgroup comfort.  Our expectation that essentialism would exacerbate the impact of 
interdependent self-construal was not supported. In fact, the opposite was found; among 
those with higher essentialist beliefs, interdependent self-construal was also related to more 
outgroup comfort, and among those with lower essentialist beliefs, interdependent self-
construal was unrelated to outgroup comfort.  
Our finding that interdependence is related to more outgroup comfort is unique 
relative to the body of literature that has tended to find harmful intergroup outcomes.  To be 
sure, our intent is not to simply imply that the inverse is true—that interdependence is 
always related to adaptive intergroup outcomes—rather our intent is to raise complexity 
regarding the persistent finding that interdependence necessarily results in poor intergroup 
outcomes. 
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  Outgroup comfort, unlike many other intergroup measures, is specifically designed 
to assess comfort in situations in which one is a numerical minority.  Thus, interdependence 
may be an adaptive mechanism within contexts in which one lacks situational power.  
Interdependent self-construals may be particularly adaptive for people of color for whom 
being a minority in a social context is a common—if not every day—experience.  Adjusting 
one’s self to fit in when they are a minority in a social context may be one way in which 
people of color find comfort and safety, while still preserving strong ethnic and cultural 
identities. We are reminded here of Loren’s proclamation in Lee Mun Wah’s The Color of 
Fear, that he: “…can’t wait to go home [from work] and become a Black man again.” This 
finding is consistent with Tawa and Suyemoto’s (2010) qualitative study examining the 
function of self-construals for Asian Americans, in which participants discussed 
interdependent self-construals as allowing them to fit in with the dominant majority to 
minimize marginalization and racism. 
Interdependence was also related to greater comfort interacting in outgroup settings 
among White participants, and thus may also serve an adaptive function for White people in 
situations in which they are a numerical minority.  As the dominant majority, interacting in 
outgroup settings may be more of an option rather than inevitability.  Seen another way, 
failing to adjust one’s behavioral tendencies in outgroup settings may lead White people to 
feel greater discomfort, and ultimately may lead to greater avoidance of situations in which 
they cross cultural borders.  For White people and professionals, developing interdependent 
self-construals may be one means by which they achieve cultural competence and sensitivity, 
and the ability to work and interact comfortably in cross-cultural settings.   
 The finding that higher levels of sociopolitical understandings of race can increase 
the positive impact of interdependent self-construals for people of color supports our 
perspective that people who understand that races are malleable social categories with no 
inherent trait abilities, are less likely to limit those included in their self-boundary to only 
racial ingroup members.  We would also encourage future researchers to examine how the 
development of sociopolitical beliefs about race may work to buffer the negative impact of 
interdependent self-construals on intergroup outcomes that was found in the research 
described earlier (e.g., Duclos & Barash, 2014).  In addition, these findings point to the role 
that multicultural education can play in de-pathologizing people of color.  By teaching 
sociopolitical notions of race, educators can provide contexts in which people of color can 
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retain cultural values of interdependence and even use these cultural strengths to develop 
positive relations across groups.  Yet, it seems that these educational interventions need to 
include a discussion of racism and power in the conceptualizations of race; it may not be 
enough to simply debunk biological notions of race in favor of more humanistic ones.  Our 
finding of positive relations of interdependence are echoed by only one other study in our 
review, the study by Yeh and Arora (2003), which was conducted with a participant pool of 
school counselors, with an overall high level of exposure to multicultural counseling, and 
perhaps more nominalist notions of race.  Further research should more directly examine 
how racial nominalism can be imparted through education, and the role of multicultural 
education to promote positive intergroup relations.    
An additional contribution of our study is the development of a measurement tool 
for directly examining two beliefs about race, which have to our knowledge not been 
previously examined: humanist and sociopolitical.  Our findings further support the 
importance of examining these dimensions of racial nominalism as separate constructs, and 
the importance of not simply measuring “socially constructed” beliefs about race by reverse 
scoring essentialist beliefs about race as has been done in previous research (e.g., Kung et al., 
2017; No et al., 2008).  In fact, while humanist belief in race was negatively correlated with 
essentialism, sociopolitical belief in race was not correlated with essentialism.   
As predicted, unlike sociopolitical beliefs, humanism did not have a moderating 
effect on the relationship between interdependent self-construal and outgroup comfort.  Our 
expectation was that humanism would not benefit people with interdependent self-
construals in minority settings because it does not necessitate an understanding of racism 
and power structures.  However, contrary to our expectations, humanism was related to more 
awareness of racism (i.e., lower levels of colorblindness).  Thus, at this point we are 
uncertain about why humanism and sociopolitical views differently interact with 
interdependence, and such an area of inquiry would be fruitful for further research.  
Furthermore, although not a focus of our study, we did find that each beliefs of race had a 
different direct relationship with outgroup comfort; essentialism was related to less comfort, 
humanism was related to more comfort, and sociopolitical beliefs did not have a direct 
relationship to outgroup comfort (see Table 3).  Thus, humanism may have an even greater 
direct benefit for intergroup relations than sociopolitical beliefs.  Sociopolitical beliefs may 
have a more conditional relationship to outgroup comfort; for example, a person of color 
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who is in a stage of developing an understanding of how race was developed as a way to 
justify slavery may have an understandable, if only temporary, discomfort in White social 
settings. Again, a greater understanding of the humanist and sociopolitical constructs should 
be explored in future research.    
Although for the whole sample essentialism was directly related to less outgroup 
comfort, our regression analyses suggest that among people with higher levels of 
essentialism, interdependent self-construals were related to more outgroup comfort; this latter 
finding was quite contrary to our predictions.  We expected that essentialism would only 
serve to increase interdependent self-construers’ tendency towards ingrouping, and 
consequently adversely impact intergroup relations.  In fact, this finding is particularly 
challenging in light of the notion that from a wider theoretical lens, greater complexity in 
understanding group boundaries should generally improve intergroup outcomes (Hogg, 
Abrams, & Brewer, 2017).  Yet, this theoretical inconsistency offers an opportunity to 
further our understanding of the infinitely complex interaction between the self and group.  
One possibility is that people who are relationally sensitive and who commonly derive a 
sense of self from group settings (i.e., interdependent self-construers), may be particularly 
vulnerable to discomfort in outgroup settings.  Our findings suggest that both sociopolitical 
and essentialist theories may provide such people with a means of finding comfort in 
outgroup settings.  Sociopolitical beliefs seem to work for people of color to break down 
“us” and “not-us” boundaries while simultaneously preserving an understanding of how 
power differently affects the experiences of White people and people of color.  In the 
absence of formal education in which sociopolitical beliefs are learned, essentialism may be a 
default means of finding comfort in outgroup settings.  Social identity theory has long 
recognized that in order for people to draw a sense of self-worth and regard from their 
ingroup membership, they must first assume some sense of stability and fixedness in 
boundaries that differentiate one’s ingroup from their outgroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
Having a theory that draws sharper boundaries between “us” and “not us” (Hogg, Abrams, 
& Brewer, 2017) may provide some measure of predictability, stability, and comfort in 
outgroup settings for interdependent self-construers, even if it more generally takes a toll on 
outgroup relations.  Again, however, we caution interpretation here given that our SEM 
analysis of this interaction was inconsistent with the regression analyses.    
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 Overall, the aim of this paper was to examine some contexts in which 
interdependent self-construals may be related to more adaptive intergroup outcomes.  We 
have found the emphasis on negative social consequences of interdependent self-construals 
to be troubling given that this view of self is more common in many non-Western cultures 
(Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 2011; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989), and such 
findings seem to—at least tacitly—argue for a cultural assimilation trajectory of people 
endorsing non-Western cultural values.  Thus, in the interest of cultural plurality, it behooves 
us to continue developing an understanding of the ways in which interdependent self-
construals can have potentially positive impacts on intergroup interactions. 
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Table 1. EFA Factor Loadings*, Means, and Standard Deviation for Racial Nominalism Scale Items 
 
  
Item Description 
 
 
H 
 
SP 
 
M 
 
SD 
1 Scientifically speaking, all human beings, regardless of their race, are 
descendants of a single maternal ancestor (Mitochondrial Eve)  
 
.51  4.71 1.36 
2 All members of all racial groups are members of the same human family 
  
 
.46  5.05 1.29 
3 We all share the same ancestors that originated in Africa  
 
 
.80  4.34 1.60 
4 People with ancestors near the equator often have darker skin because 
their ancestors had a greater need for melanin to protect them from the 
sun  
.48  4.75 1.25 
5 Human beings originated in Africa and changes in physical appearance 
(e.g., skin color) occurred as they migrated into different climates  
 
.75  4.23 1.58 
6 Race was a social concept invented to rationalize slavery in the United 
States  
 
 .74 3.10 1.68 
7 Race is a way to create divisions between people in order to create a 
hierarchical order  
 
 .72 3.64 1.69 
8 Race was not created in order to oppress people ® 
 
 
 -.78 3.45 1.69 
9 White people did not create the idea of race as a way to rationalize 
slavery ®  
 
 -.81 3.34 1.56 
10 Although race is not real, biologically speaking, race still influences how 
people are treated in society  
 
 .49 4.64 1.40 
11 The concept of race was created by White people for the purpose of 
maintaining power and privilege  
 
 .84 3.39 1.62 
 
* all loadings of less than .40 are suppressed for visual clarity 
 
     Note. H = Humanist belief in race; SP = Sociopolitical belief in race.  
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Table 2. Model Fit Statistics for 1-Factor, 2-Factor, and 2-Factor (modified) Solutions. 
 
Factors X2 X2/df CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR 
1 346.93** 7.89 .70 .63 .16 .12 
2 160.94** 3.74 .88 .85 .10 .07 
2-modified 95.44** 2.45 .95 .92 .07 .06 
** p < .01 
 
      Note. X2 = Chi Square; X2/df  = Chi Square / degrees of freedom; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = 
Tucker-Lewis Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; SRMR = Standardized Root 
Mean Square. 
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Table 3. Correlations among Study Variables.  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Humanist - .28** -.24** -.31** .12** .18** 
2. Sociopolitical  - .01 -.32** .29** .05 
3. Essentialist   - .42** .13** -.39** 
4. Colorblind    - -.07 -.27** 
5. Interdep. SC     - .22** 
6. OGC      - 
**p < .01; *p < .05 
 
      Note. Humanist = Humanist belief in race; Sociopolitical = Sociopolitical belief in race; Essentialist = 
Essentialist belief in race; Colorblind = Colorblind racial attitudes; Interdep. SC = Interdependent self-
construal; OGC = Outgroup comfort.  
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Table 4. Tests of Group Differences on Primary Study Variables. 
 
 INT OC E H SP 
Race λ = .95; F = 14.84**; 𝜂𝑝
2 = .049 
 
White 58.96b (10.20) 75.05 (12.85) 48.25b (12.27) 23.33a (4.67) 21.08b (3.39) 
Non-White 62.08a (8.68) 76.87 (12.56) 51.83a (12.26) 22.11b (4.91) 22.17a (3.78) 
Immigration  λ = .99; F = 2.31; 𝜂𝑝
2 = .008 
 
U.S. Born 59.72 (9.76) 75.64 (12.63) 49.13 (12.18) 23.03 (4.75) 21.39 (3.53) 
Immigrant 61.40 (10.48) 75.95 (13.68) 52.14 (12.40) 21.98 (4.90) 21.81 (3.79) 
Gender λ = 1.00; F = 0.13; 𝜂𝑝
2 = .000 
 
Male 59.24 (10.30) 72.83b (13.94) 51.54a (12.65) 23.02 (4.81) 21.47 (3.53) 
Female 60.39 (9.54) 77.29 a (11.79) 48.31b (11.89) 22.83 (4.78) 21.43 (3.61) 
a – b   difference is significant at p < .01; ** MANOVA test for H and SP is significant at p < .01 
       Note. INT = Interdependent self-construal; OC = Outgroup comfort; E = Essentialist belief in race; H = 
Humanist belief in race; SP= Sociopolitical belief in race. 
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Table 5. Hierarchical Regressions on Outgroup Comfort. 
 
 ß SE CI R2 ∆R2 
Step 1    .24 - 
INT 0.27** 0.04 [ 0.20 ~  0.35]   
H 0.07 0.04 [-0.01 ~  0.15]   
SP -0.06 0.04 [-0.14 ~  0.02]   
E -0.41** 0.04 [-0.49 ~ -0.34]   
POC 0.19 0.08 [ 0.02 ~  0.35]   
Step 2    .52 .03** 
INT 0.32** 0.05 [ 0.22 ~  0.41]   
H 0.08 0.05 [-0.02 ~  0.18]   
SP -0.14** 0.05 [-0.24 ~ -0.04]   
E -0.45** 0.05 [-0.54 ~ -0.36]   
POC 0.17* 0.08 [ 0.00 ~  0.33]   
INT x H -0.06 0.04 [-0.13 ~  0.01]   
INT x SP 0.03 0.03 [-0.03 ~  0.10]   
INT x E 0.11** 0.03 [ 0.05 ~  0.17]   
POC x INT -0.13 0.09 [-0.31 ~  0.05]   
POC x H -0.06 0.09 [-0.24 ~  0.11]   
POC x SP 0.18* 0.09 [ 0.01 ~  0.35]   
POC x E 0.04 0.09 [-0.13 ~  0.21]   
Step 3    .52 .01 
INT 0.30** 0.05 [ 0.21 ~  0.39]   
H 0.09 0.05 [-0.02 ~  0.18]   
SP -0.15** 0.05 [-0.24 ~ -0.05]   
E -0.44** 0.05 [-0.53 ~ -0.35]   
POC 0.17* 0.09 [ 0.00 ~  0.34]   
INT x H -0.04 0.04 [-0.12 ~  0.04]   
INT x SP -0.01 0.03 [-0.08 ~  0.07]   
INT x E 0.12** 0.03 [ 0.05 ~  0.19]   
POC x INT -0.13 0.09 [-0.31 ~  0.05]   
POC x H -0.02 0.09 [-0.20 ~  0.16]   
POC x SP 0.11 0.09 [-0.07 ~  0.29]   
POC x E 0.06 0.09 [-0.12 ~  0.23]   
INT x POC x H -0.11 0.09 [-0.29 ~  0.78]   
INT x POC x SP 0.181* 0.08 [ 0.02 ~  0.34]   
INT x POC x E -0.07 0.09 [-0.23 ~  0.10]   
* p < .05; **p < .01 
 
Note. INT = interdependent self-construal; H = humanistic belief about race; SP = sociopolitical 
beliefs about race; E = essentialist belief about race; POC = person of color vs. White. 
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Figure 1. Moderation of Sociopolitical on Interdependent Self-Construal and Outgroup Comfort for 
People of Color 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Note. “Low” is one standard deviation below the mean and “high” is one standard deviation above the 
mean.  
 
 
  
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
3.2
3.4
3.6
3.8
4
Low int High int
O
u
tg
ro
u
p
 c
o
m
fo
rt
Low SP
High SP
CONSTRUALS OF SELF AND GROUP     36      
Figure 2. Moderation of Essentialism on Interdependent Self-Construal and Outgroup Comfort  
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Note. “Low” is one standard deviation below the mean and “high” is one standard deviation above the 
mean. 
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